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Abstract
In international law and the ethics of war, there are a variety of
actions which are seen as particularly problematic and presumed to
be always or inherently wrong, or in need of some overwhelmingly
strong justification to override the presumption against them. One of
these actions is assassination, in particular, assassination of heads of
state. In this essay I argue that the presumption against assassination
is incorrect. In particular, I argue that if in a given scenario war is
justified, then assassination of the enemy state’s leader is also justified,
and in fact ought to be pursued as a means short of war. I defend
this position on both consequential and deontic grounds, arguing that
assassination is both more discriminate than war and serves to harm
only those most responsible for the situation which justifies war in the
first place. I conclude by arguing that a norm of assassination, far
from being a destabilizing force, as some have argued, would in fact
serve to reinforce international norms of rights and respect for persons
by making clear that tyrants and would-be oppressors cannot hide
behind military forces or notions of sovereignty to protect themselves
from judgment and retribution.




In international law and the ethics of war, there are a variety of actions
which are seen as particularly problematic, and are presumed to be always
or inherently wrong, or in need of some overwhelmingly strong justification
to override the presumption against them. These include, for example, such
things as targeting civilians, using biological or chemical weapons, hiding
troops or weapons among civilian populations, or hiding combat units or
matériel behind medical, religious, or neutral banners, to name just a few.
Each of these types of action is seen as especially wrong, and (I would ar-
gue) rightly so. They undermine many of the conventions required to wage
anything other than so-called “total war”, and they damage the possibili-
ties for establishing peace. More than this, these actions make the violence
and destruction of war inescapable for civilians,1 often in fact bringing these
horrors down on them intentionally.
However, there is another type of action that, to use the phrasing of
one prominent theorist, is seen as likewise “morally odious”2 or “morally
abhorrent”3, but which can be used to minimize harm to non-combatants
(in some cases eliminating it altogether) and to drastically limit the violence
and destruction of war. This is the practice of assassination.
In this essay I challenge the traditional view that assassination is a morally
problematic or unacceptable tactic, arguing that assassination is in fact
morally superior to conventional military engagements. I defend this point
on both consequential and deontological grounds, and argue that assassi-
nation, far from demonstrating a disrespect for human life or undermining
international moral and legal norms, in fact can be used to strengthen moral
and legal norms internationally and presents the most effective method for
respecting individual human lives in situations of international conflict.4
1Throughout this text I will use the terms “civilian”, “non-combatant”, and “innocent”
interchangeably to indicate any agent who is morally innocent, or at least not morally liable
to being harmed. There are many discussions of moral and material (non)innocence which
are interesting and complex, but these will not be relevant for the discussion here. For an
excellent recent treatment of the moral distinction between civilians or non-combatants
and soldiers, as well as the justification and basis for that distinction, see, for example,
Lazar (2015).
2Gross (2010), p. 101.
3Gross (2004), p. 99.
4A similar argument is briefly presented by Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath
Wellman. However their focus is consequential reasons for assassination, and their discus-
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The argument is structured as follows. First, I cover some definitional
points and distinctions which are important for the arguments to come. I
then argue that assassination is preferable to conventional war on two dis-
tinct deontic grounds, namely retributivism and respect for persons. I then
move to the consequential argument for assassination, arguing that assassi-
nation presents a method for (potentially) avoiding war, or at the very least
as a last resort to be utilized before war. The final argument in favor of
assassination makes use of both deontic and consequential considerations,
maintaining that assassination may be deemed permissible as a method for
punishment and deterrence of grave breaches of international law and crimes
against humanity. With the positive arguments for assassination in place,
I consider some lingering objections to the practice and conclude by argu-
ing that, at the very least, assassination will be permissible in any situation
where conventional war is permissible.
Before continuing it may be useful to point out that the arguments pre-
sented here only aim to show that assassination can be a morally permissible
(perhaps obligatory) course of action, but do not address any of the prac-
ticalities of carrying out particular assassinations. Thus, who ought to be
carrying out assassinations or what methods are best utilized are questions
left unanswered. Such further inquiry is a vital step that must be taken if
assassination is to ever become an acceptable practice, but it is unfortunately
beyond the scope of this work. The aim here is simply to lift the stigma and
prejudice against assassination so that such practical work may be pursued
by legal scholars and authorities on international relations who are better
suited to such empirical and policy-making tasks.
2 Targeted Killing vs. Assassination
Let us begin by clearing up the definitional space, as it were, and making
clear exactly what is at stake. First of all, the arguments to come concern
assassination, and not the related concept of “targeted killing” (though there
may be some overlap between the discussion of these two practices). Given
this, it will be crucial to first make clear how each of these concepts is defined.
Now, there is a fair degree of imprecision and ambiguity in the way these
sion is limited to assassination as a form of humanitarian intervention. See Altman and
Wellman (2008), esp. pp. 250–7.
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terms are used in common discourse, but the core elements of each can be
distinguished to (at least) a fair extent.
Targeted killing, despite being often criticized as either immoral, inef-
fective, or both,5 is a common element of the counter-terror operations of
nations such as the United States, Israel, Russia, and until recently, the
United Kingdom.6 The methods used (e.g. drone strikes, special forces
“clearing” operations, enemy turncoats, etc.) and the particular agents tar-
geted (e.g. terrorists, guerrilla fighters, bomb-makers, etc.) may vary greatly,
but the core element of targeted killing is that it is the “premeditated, pre-
emptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or
believed to represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and secu-
rity of a state”.7 More importantly, targeted killing is done “exclusively for
reasons of state self-defense”,8 and is thereby capable of being legal under
international norms.9 Also, targeted killing cannot be used simply as a blan-
ket policy for the hunting and killing of any soldier, commander, terrorist,
or insurgent, but is limited in its scope to only those who pose a real threat
(or are reasonably believed to pose such a threat).10 In essence, targeted
killing allows states to fight combatants they would otherwise be unable to,
as terrorists and insurgents do not wear uniforms and often hide amongst the
civilian population, undermining the traditional conventions of war. With-
out being able to clearly see who the enemy is (by virtue of a flag on their
shoulder or a combat dress that is clearly recognizable), it becomes necessary
to identify them individually and compile a list of all known enemy combat-
ants, and using this list, target them; hence, “targeted killing”.11 Targeted
5See David (2003) for a refreshingly balanced and reflective examination of targeted
killing, with all its potential dangers and advantages.
6Hunter (2009), p. 7.
7Hunter (2009), p. 3.
8Hunter (2009), p. 5.
9Art. 51 of the UN Charter explicitly allows for the uni-lateral use of force for the
purposes of national self-defense, thereby providing a legal justification for the practice of
targeted killing, so long as it does not violate other aspects of the UN Charter (e.g. state
sovereignty). See (http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html)
10The requirement that targets must be “reasonably believed” to pose a threat opens up
a number of complications concerning reasonable belief, reasonable agents, and competent
judges, all of which would take us too far afield. In what follows, I utilize a notion
of justification based on reasonable belief in line with that presented in Lazar (2012),
especially pp. 7–10, but the concept can be filled out in other fashions as well.
11Gross (2010), pp. 108–9.
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killing may also be used as a method for eliminating particularly dangerous
enemy commanders who are otherwise incapable of being reached through
standard combat operations.
Assassination, on the other hand, cannot be so easily dealt with, as it
involves not just the killing of those who directly pose a threat, but also
political leaders or other elected officials. So, whereas targeted killing is the
premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of those who pose a future
threat to the safety and security of a state, assassination is the premed-
itated and intentional killing of prominent persons for reasons other than
self-defense.12 These other reasons may be of a political, ideological, finan-
cial, personal, moral, or other nature, but most importantly, the act of killing
will not be justified in terms of self-defense.13 For example, the intentional
downing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plane on April 18, 1943, would
constitute an instance of targeted killing, as he posed a clear future threat
to U.S. safety and security,14 whereas the plan to kill Fidel Castro, reviewed
throughout the 1960’s and authorized by at least one director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, would arguably be a case of assassination for ideological
and political reasons, as Castro at that time presented no such direct threat
to U.S. security.15 Put shortly, targeted killing is killing for the purposes of
12There are some understandings of assassination which simply define it as wrong. For
example, Emer de Vattel called assassination “treacherous murder”, thereby signifying
that it is not just wrong, but doubly wrong, being murder (which is defined as wrongful
killing) that is “treacherous”. See Zengel (1991), p. 128, quoting Vattel (1758) Law of
Nations. This, however, is unhelpful, as we ought to be able to understand and discuss
a term without having already judged it. See Corlett (1996), Schwenkenbecher (2012);
and Steinhoff (2007) for defenses of the need for so-called “neutral” definitions of terms.
Though these authors are concerned with defining and examining terrorism, rather than
assassination, their points are equally relevant to our discussion.
13This definition does not exactly follow that provided in Hunter (2009), as he defines
assassination as “the premeditated killing of a prominent person for political or ideological
reasons” (p. 4, emphasis added). I choose to define the concept more broadly, as there can
conceivably be instances of assassination where a prominent figure is targeted for reasons
other than political or ideological ones. For instance, had some nation chosen to have
Idi Amin, the former dictator or Uganda, killed because of his tyrannical regime in that
nation, this would arguably have been for moral reasons. The same would (plausibly) hold
for Colonel von Stauffenberg, who attempted to assassinate Hitler to, at least in part, end
World War II and prevent further unnecessary bloodshed, making his justification also (at
least partly) a moral one.
14See Glines (1990) for a comprehensive discussion of the U.S. operation to kill Ya-
mamoto.
15For extensive documentation of the U.S. plot to assassinate Castro, as well as similar
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self-defense (even though the targeted individual(s) may only present a future
threat), whereas assassination is killing for reasons other than self-defense.16
In what follows we will be concerned with the moral assessment of as-
sassination alone, and not with targeted killing. This is important to stress
because there has been an outpouring of literature on targeted killings in
recent years, especially since the U.S. and Israel have both openly adopted
such tactics in their respective counter-terror operations.17 Assassination, on
the other hand, has received comparatively little treatment,18 being seen by
most as simply wrong, and being illegal under both U.S.19 and international
law.20 This alone provides a strong reason for exploring assassination fur-
ther, as it seems to present a uniquely optimal alternative to war in certain
situations, despite the many prejudices against it.
It also worth noting that assassination is, by virtually all contemporary
accounts, an illegal activity. The arguments to be presented will not respond
to or object to this fact, but will instead be purely moral ones, building
to the conclusion that, despite its illegality, assassination can be a morally
permissible (perhaps obligatory) tactic to pursue in certain scenarios. Re-
lated to this, whenever the terms “permissible” or “obligatory” are used in
the arguments to come, these should be understood as referring to moral
permissions and obligations, unless explicitly stated otherwise. This is im-
plots directed against various South and Central American leaders, as well as leaders in
other parts of the world, see Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations (1975),
esp. chapter III, freely available at (https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit).
16David (2003) also provides an insightful discussion of the distinction between assassi-
nation and targeted killing.
17See, for example, David (2003), Hunter (2009); and the exchange between Gross (2004,
2006); and Statman (2004), to name just a few examples.
18Notable exceptions are Beres (1995), Zengel (1991).
19Executive Order 12333 explicitly forbids U.S. intelligence agencies from committing or
aiding in assassinations. The relevant sections are: “2.11 Prohibition on Assassination. No
person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in or
conspire to engage in assassination.” and “2.12 Indirect Participation. No element of the
Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities
forbidden by this Order.” See https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/eo12333.html. Notably,
this executive order does not spell out exactly what constitutes an act of assassination.
20The 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Repression of Terrorism, the UN Char-
ter, the 1973 New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, and the 1999 Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Art. 2) provide the
main agreements which codify the (international) illegality of assassination. See also Beres
(1995) for an excellent treatment of the nuances of the legal status of assassination.
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portant to bear in mind, as there are a variety of actions which may be moral
in particular situations, but which are and ought to be illegal in general. I
am not certain whether assassination ought to be a legal practice or not,
and the arguments to follow will reflect this uncertainty, focusing instead
only on the moral aspects of assassination and leaving discussions of law and
international treaties and agreements to scholars more suited to that task.
Before moving onto the arguments, one final preliminary remark is in
order. The conclusions that I will be arguing for (that assassination is a
permissible tactic in war, and a permissible alternative to war) will be con-
ditional on a variety of factors (to be presented below), and should not be
taken to constitute a blanket statement endorsing assassination. My claims
do not support the idea that assassination is a legitimate method of statecraft
or that it can be used as a form of Clausewitzian “diplomacy”, but only the
much more limited claim that if a war is already underway, or if one is on the
verge of entering war, then assassination will be permissible (perhaps even
obligatory). This limitation is crucial to keep in mind, otherwise a limited
moral argument can rapidly become confused with an endorsement of relative
anarchy in the international sphere, with no leader trusting another, and no
possibility for diplomacy or communal projects. This state is precisely what
opponents of assassination fear, and is a legitimate concern, one which my
arguments do not go against.
So, to briefly summarize, our concern is with assassination, or the pre-
meditated intentional killing of a prominent person (usually a state leader)
for reasons other than self-defense. We will not be considering practices sim-
ilar to assassination (e.g. targeted killing), nor will we discuss the legality
of assassination. Our arguments will be purely moral ones, and will build to
the conclusion that assassination will be a permissible (perhaps obligatory)
tactic to employ during war, and will also present a permissible (perhaps
obligatory) alternative to war. This conclusion, however, will not mean that
assassination is always permissible, or that it may be used to further ideo-
logical or political goals.
3 Innocence and Guilt
One of the greatest evils of war is not that it kills, but that it kills the
innocent. For many, this alone provides an insurmountable moral hurdle,
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demanding that one forsake war altogether.21 However, one might claim
that if war can be waged without causing any so-called “collateral damage”,
that is, civilian deaths, then this provides a way to avoid this difficulty.22
This is too quick though, for many soldiers are also “innocent”, morally
speaking. They may be conscripts, who had no choice in the matter and
would be shot if they deserted, they may be children, without the ability
to fully understand or meaningfully object to what they are doing, or they
may even be free volunteers, but ones who joined in order to do the right
thing.23 However, any way you look at it, there are clearly soldiers fighting
throughout the world who really are innocent (or at least mostly innocent)
for one reason or another. Given this, simply avoiding all civilian casualties,
an (arguably) impossible task on its own, will not suffice to prevent the killing
of innocents, as some of those we actively target will also be morally innocent
combatants. At the very least, the combatants who we do kill – front-line
“grunts” usually with little education, little economic alternative to fighting,
and little ability to leave once they’re in – are clearly more innocent than the
host of commanders and political leaders sending orders down the line.24
Given this, why is it seen as morally (not to mention legally) acceptable
to kill these soldiers, but not the people sitting comfortably in a presidential
palace or governmental office? Why do combat fatigues and a rifle make
one a “legitimate” target, while the architects of tyranny and genocide are
off-limits simply because they are civilians? How can we understand, much
less justify, the morality of killing soldiers but sparing leaders? The simple
answer is: We cannot.
To see why this is so, let us consider a rather straightforward example.
21Pacifism has a rich history in philosophical and religious thought, and can be grounded
in many ways, one of which is by looking to the notion of “innocence”, however that is to
be spelled out. For an introductory reading on pacifism which provides discussion of its
varieties, grounds, and developments, see Fiala (2018).
22Though it is extraordinarily unlikely that a modern war could ever be waged without
causing at least some civilian deaths.
23I take it that a volunteer soldier whose only aim is to further some moral goal, say,
protecting the innocent from harm, is him- or herself also morally innocent. Putting on a
uniform and carrying a rifle does not inherently make one non-innocent, especially if one
only does those things for the sake of moral imperatives.
24Michael Robillard and Bradley Strawser provide an excellent treatment of the under-
explored idea of “moral exploitation” and how this affects soldiers, even volunteer ones.
Though their arguments are aimed at something else, many of their conclusions support
the ideas being presented here. See Robillard and Strawser (2016).
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Suppose there is a young man entering into politics, at a time of crisis and
turmoil. He is not a military man, though he has served in combat before as
a despatch runner. No, he is a politician and an agitator, a fiend for finding
what riles people up, and using that to advance his cause. Eventually he and
his party secure power in the government (possibly through illegal means,
but that is another matter), and subsequently consolidate and extend that
power to the point of having established a supreme dictatorship. Under this
man’s leadership the military of his nation is made ready for war, and is
summarily deployed to invade nearly every neighboring state. At the same
time political dissidents and various other “undesirables” are rounded up
by secret police and special military detachments, and then taken away to
camps where they are to be treated as slaves or executed. To be sure there
are many people responsible, and to varying degrees, but there is a single
man who envisioned all of this, who planned to plunge his nation into an
aggressive war, who adamantly sought the obliteration of entire peoples and
ways of life, and who knew exactly what he was doing all the while.
The question then is whether it is morally acceptable to find and kill this
man, to assassinate him? As he is a political leader and no military man, we
cannot speak of targeted killing or the exigencies of war, it is assassination,
pure and simple. To make the case more compelling, let us give this man
a name, and his name is, as many may have already guessed, Adolf Hitler.
Now, if the question is “Would it be moral to assassinate Hitler?”, I assume
the answer would be a resounding “yes”, for almost any individual we might
ask, and this would be the correct answer. This man is clearly guilty of a
host of horrifying crimes, crimes beyond all imagining. He is far more guilty
than the vast majority of German men and women who will be killed as a
result of his actions and choices. And furthermore, his death alone will have
a significant impact on the war and on the conditions inside Germany (with
respect to those oppressed groups Hitler himself singled out), an impact that
could never be achieved by the killing of any other German citizen. Given
that he is, to a large extent, the one to blame for much of the bloodshed, and
that he is at least more to blame than others, then we have some reason to
target him. The fact that his death would make a greater impact than the
death of any other makes certain that we ought to target him before targeting
any other, and this despite the fact that it would clearly be an instance of
assassination.
Now, this position includes a number of points worth highlighting. First,
it is important to recognize that this can be justified on two independent
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deontic grounds. On the one hand, we may say that it is permissible (perhaps
obligatory) to assassinate Hitler (or any other person in a relevantly similar
situation) on grounds of retribution.25 The basic idea is that because of what
he has done, he deserves to die. Put differently, respect for the victims of his
crimes and respect for the moral law demands retribution, otherwise injustice
is allowed to go unpunished. Now, this position may seem a bit harsh, that
a man may deserve to die, and I myself am inclined to reject such Draconian
backward-looking principles. However, there is a separate deontic argument
for the conclusion that assassination is permissible (perhaps obligatory) in
these circumstances. The argument runs as follows: In order to prevent
greater injustice and suffering we must resist the onslaught of this man’s
armies and in fact defeat him entirely. We can go about this by killing
hundreds of thousands of his soldiers (and likely many civilians as well),
or we can kill the man himself, cutting off the head, as it were. Since we
must kill someone (that is the only way to prevent injustice), then we ought
to kill the most guilty, and spare those who are most or more innocent.
Thus, protecting the innocent demands assassination, as many Germans are
innocent as well, even Germans fighting under Hitler’s banner. At the very
least, these Germans are more innocent than Hitler, so it is morally better to
spare them. This second argument does not imply that we ought necessarily
to kill Hitler, as we could spare him if circumstances allowed for his capture,
but it does imply that he ought to be targeted first in any situation where
there is some number of deaths to be distributed. Therefore, this principle
shows more respect for the soldiers and civilians killed in war, by recognizing
their level of innocence in the conflict, and allowing, in fact demanding, that
the most guilty party be targeted first, even if that party is a civilian head
of state.26
Second, not only does this principle show more respect for the innocent,
it also shows more respect for the guilty who we kill. To see why this is
so, consider a hypothetical assassination of Hitler, in which a small team of
special forces are snuck into Berlin where they storm the building he lives in,
25Retributivism is a rich theory with far too much literature for us to adequately cover
or engage with here. For an introduction and ample list of further readings see Walen
(2016).
26Obviously these arguments are rather simplistic versions of deontic notions that have
a richly varied literature and understanding, but they will suffice for our purposes, and
any detailed exploration of retributivism or the notion of moral (non)innocence will take
us too far afield.
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killing a number of SS guards along the way, and ultimating shooting Hitler.
Suppose also that those SS guards who are killed during the operation are
some of the most devout Nazis, and have done a host of morally despicable
things, making them nearly as guilty as Hitler himself (this is in fact why he
trusts them so fully). Now, in such a hypothetical operation, the SS guards,
while being nearly as bad as Hitler, are killed for no other reason than the
pattern of the flag stitched onto their uniforms, and the fact that they are
holding rifles. In a very real sense, they are simply in the wrong place at the
wrong time, as they wouldn’t be killed if they weren’t guarding Hitler.
Given this, in such a situation we show more respect to Hitler than we
do to his guards. The reason for this is because the guards are killed for
no other reason than because they are “in the way”. We do not treat them
as human beings worthy of respect, we treat them as objects impeding our
progress, obstacles to be removed. Our interactions with Hitler’s guards are
no different than our interaction with the door to his bedroom which we
kick down in order to get to him, and this is true for every soldier we kill
in war. However, when we kill Hitler, we kill him specifically. He, as an
individual human being, is sought out so that we may execute him, because
of the things he has done and the things he will do in the future. We look on
his individuality and agency and we respond to that and only that. Soldiers,
civilians, and other victims of war die because of an accident of birth, because
they found themselves living in a nation at war, a nation where it could be
dangerous to step out of line. But when we assassinate a leader who is
committed to aggressive war and crimes against humanity, we are killing
that leader in virtue of what he or she has done. It matters not what flag
flies behind them, or where they were born, or any other circumstances of
luck; we kill them because of what they have done, and this pays heed to
their individuality and moral worth (or lack thereof).27
Furthermore, the preceding discussion brings to light another point im-
plicit in the principle above, that not only is assassination permissible in
certain situations, it is morally preferable to actions which would involve the
killing of any agents other than the leader, or more generally, the assassina-
27One may (perhaps rightly) object that we cannot properly show respect when we take
an individual’s life, but we certainly show more respect to Hitler than we do to his guards,
in virtue of not treating him as a mere obstacle to be removed or object to be done with
as we see fit. In short, by treating him as a moral agent and not simply a thing, he is
given more respect than his guards. Thanks to (colleague) for helping me to recognize
these more subtle points.
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tion target.28 This is because assassination shows more respect to all parties
involved than war ever could, and responds to each individual in terms of
that person’s moral guilt or innocence, rather than simply treating everyone
as either an impersonal dehumanized threat to be eliminated or potential
obstacle that (unfortunately) must be removed.
Therefore, assassination is permissible on various deontic grounds, and
provides the only solid method (other than pacifism) for ensuring that our
actions do not harm innocent agents. More than this, assassination meets
the pacifist objection head-on, providing a clear way for states to enforce
rights internationally and punish those who would disrespect them or who
would wage aggressive war. Assassination, due to its pin-point nature, also
makes it possible for us to only harm those who we are certain are guilty, or
at least more guilty, eliminating much of the moral hazard involved in killing
during the “fog of war”.29 For all of these reasons, it should be clear that,
at least on deontic grounds, assassination is not as morally problematic as
some would have us believe, and is in fact far preferable to war.
4 Reducing the Bloodshed
One may grant all of the above arguments – assassination does allow us to
only harm the guilty, it provides a method for enforcing rights and punishing
aggressors without bringing about the deaths of innocents, and it shows more
respect for all involved than war ever could – but still simply say “So what?
Assassination, by its very intent, creates chaos and anarchy in a state by
cutting off the head, and this can lead to just as much or more bloodshed than
war. More than this, that which fills a power vacuum is seldom more pleasant
than that which was removed in the first place, and often we accomplish
nothing more than trading an evil we know and understand for one we do
not, and this new evil is rarely one we can quickly or with any strong level
of confidence contain or eliminate.” At least, this is the objection that many
28The more general claim is important to include as there may be cases where we may (or
ought to) kill some prominent figure other than the actual leader, such as a propaganda
minister or head of the secret police. This will especially be the case when prominent
figures are acting without the consent or against the wishes of the actual government, but
for some reason the government is incapable of reigning in these figures.
29This avoids the objection by some authors that assassination, in virtue of naming the
target, demands a demonstration of moral guilt, which is purported to pose a problem.
See, e.g. Gross (2004), pp. 105–7.
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might raise to assassination.
Now, it is important at the outset to point out that this objection does
not technically undermine the argument here. The conclusion I am arguing
for is modest, in that it merely challenges the blanket prohibition against
assassination, maintaining that assassination can be permissible in some sit-
uations and that it is almost certainly permissible in any situation where war
is permissible. I am not arguing that assassination is always a morally viable
option, nor that it can be used for any goal a state might have. I am sim-
ply arguing that it is possible that assassination be morally right or morally
allowable. Now, if we are focused on consequences, then this conclusion is
clearly acceptable, as there are clearly possible scenarios where assassination
would be best. Consider the assassination of Hitler, which would have re-
moved one of the most virulent proponents of the “final solution”, thereby
likely allowing for the saving of millions of lives. Or consider a case like that
of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, whose actions led to the deaths of between
1.5 and 3 million people (roughly 25% of the population of Cambodia at that
time). Though many were responsible for the deaths attending the Khmer
Rouge’s policies, Pol Pot strongly influenced the vision and implementation
of a purely agrarian and absolutely self-sufficient society, and it is likely that
his death alone would have prevented much suffering in the long run. Now,
we may disagree about the details and counterfactual assessments in these
particular examples, but it is still the case that it is possible for assassination
to have a positive effect, and this alone makes the argument stand (with
regard to consequential assessments).
However, though a blanket prohibition against assassination cannot be
maintained on consequential grounds, it is still worth exploring when exactly
assassination would be permissible or obligatory on grounds of consequential-
ism. Put differently, it is all well and good to say “It’s possible it would be
best, so the prohibition does not stand.”, but this is not of much help unless
we also say when it actually would be best. The arguments of this section
will all be contingent and will also be somewhat speculative. However, they
will delineate a clear set of scenarios in which assassination would (almost
certainly)30 be morally permissible, if not obligatory. It may also be useful
to point out that the points developed in this section are not wholly inde-
pendent of those made above, but rather complement them. Above it was
30The qualifier is necessary, as there will always exist outlier cases that do not follow
the general rule.
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argued that assassination is always morally superior (on deontic grounds)
insofar as it spares the innocent, punishes the guilty, and shows more respect
to all individuals. In this section we will explore when assassination is able
to provide (morally) better results, irrespective of considerations of guilt and
innocence, and by putting these two conclusions together, we arrive at a sure
set of instances where assassination is permissible or obligatory, i.e. those
cases where both sets of moral considerations point in favor of assassination.
The first and most clear case where assassination is likely to bring about
positive results is in situations where there is some prominent figure (or
small group of agents) that is central to the functioning or propagation of
a harmful policy,31 and where the elimination of that figure (or that small
group of agents) alone would halt or mitigate the harmful practice. For
example, there have been many situations throughout history where some
small group of agents wrested control of government from the democratically
elected leadership, and then, because they were a minority attempting to
retain power, proceeded to “liquidate” many elements of the population that
might threaten the usurper’s grasp over the nation. Such cases abounded
throughout South and Central America during the years of the Cold War,
when the United States assisted (or at least encouraged) a number of fascist
groups to overthrow leftist democratically elected governments, and these
fascist leaders then began decades-long policies of political suppression, vio-
lence, and state terror in order to prevent popular uprisings.32 Now, given
that these situations were ones where a democratically elected government
was overthrown, it is a given that the majority of the population did not
support the usurper’s regime. From this, we can further conclude that “cut-
ting off the head” in such a situation would likely lead to a return to the
democratic leadership and values that were present prior to the coup d’état
(assuming that not all opposition or resistance leaders were killed in the in-
31“Harmful policy” can include any governmental decision that is harmful to a group of
individuals, but the amount of harm will have to be enough to justify the killing of indi-
viduals in order to prevent or mitigate that policy’s effects. I am not prepared to provide
a precise schematic of exactly how much harm is necessary in order for assassination to be
justified (nor am I convinced there exists such a clean-cut metric), but we can at least say
that aggressive war and grave human rights violations on a large scale will provide suffi-
cient reason to target those responsible. In order to make more fine-grained judgments,
it will be necessary to explore the findings here alongside some more foundational moral
and political theory.
32The most extensive and organized instantiation of this was through Operation Condor.
For a careful and considered treatment of Operation Condor, see McSherry (2012).
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terim). Another type of case fitting under this general umbrella are those
situations where some subset of the leadership is committed to harmful prac-
tices, but not everyone, and so elimination of that subset can suffice for
ending the harmful policies. The examples of Hitler and Pol Pot fit this de-
scription well, and both are clear cases where assassination would have been
permissible (if not obligatory).
The second main type of case where assassination may be permissible
is when two political groups (usually the government and some opposition
party) are severely at odds with each other and one or both are unwilling to
compromise, leading to civil unrest, and in the worst cases, civil war. Now,
civil war is a tricky situation at the best of times, and most would (rightly, I
believe) argue for a “hands-off” approach, where the domestic groups are left
to settle their disputes without extensive outside pressure.33 However, there
are cases where the unrest is solely due to the intractability of a small group of
agents, and where the general population who bears the brunt of the violence
is willing to compromise for the sake of peace and stability. In such instances,
it is, on consequential grounds, permissible to eliminate those intractable
parties in order to facilitate the peace process and end the fighting. Thus,
if a region is suffering under civil war or other violent civil unrest and the
cause of that unrest is the unwillingness of one or more parties to offer any
concessions or compromises for the sake of peace, then assassination can be
permissible. Importantly, assassination will not automatically be permissible
in these circumstances, as civil uprisings are generally complicated and messy
affairs, making it possible for assassination to fuel the violence by adding one
more grievance that may motivate further fighting. However, if the fighting
continues solely because some small group will not entertain anything less
than “total victory”, then that group’s elimination is permitted for the sake
of stemming the bloodshed.
The third type of case where assassination may be permissible on con-
sequential grounds is when there exists a sufficient just cause for war, and
all other options short of war have been tried already. Put differently, if it
would be moral to wage a war in some situation and all standard options
short of war have been tried already (e.g. diplomatic pressure, economic or
other sanctions, embargoes, small-scale military operations, etc.) then assas-
33Some outside pressure is inevitable, and arguably also helpful, as it may lead the
parties to accept a solution that is less than satisfactory from their own group’s perspective,
but which ultimately ends the violence.
Page 15
sination will be permissible. The reason assassination will be permissible in
these cases is because war is such an astoundingly destructive and morally
costly enterprise, and any option that might avert war ought to be tried
first. Since assassination might be able to prevent war, and since war will
inevitably result in far more innocent deaths than an assassination would
(even if we suppose that those who are assassinated are properly innocent,
which is unlikely), then we ought to try that option first. In fact, not only
will assassination be a better option than war, but it will sometimes be an
even better (morally speaking) option than sanctions, embargoes, or other
non-military operations. This is because these measures short of war, while
imposing less harm than war, impose harm on an entire population. Since
there are many situations where only a portion of the population, or even
only a small portion of the government, are responsible for aggressive war or
other grievous breaches of humanitarian law, a tactic which actively targets
the whole population (sanctions and embargoes do just that) will be harder
to morally justify than one which only targets the source(s) of aggression and
injustice. Therefore, assassination, in virtue of its pinpoint nature, can be
a morally better option than some policies which aim to avoid deaths alto-
gether. At any rate, assassination will always be a morally better alternative
than war.
One point worth noting about the above three types of cases is that
they are all ones in which assassination is argued to be a morally viable
option because it can prevent war or prevent aggression and grave breaches
of humanitarian law. However, assassination can also be justified as a tactic
within war or as a prelude to war. Take case three again, where we have a
moral justification for waging war, but will first assassinate the other state’s
leader in an attempt to avert war altogether. To make this more tractable,
let us imagine a case with a concrete justification for war, namely that the
offending state is carrying out a policy of genocide, incited by the state’s
top leadership, and which we hope to stop as soon as possible. So, we first
kill their leader, hoping that this will end the genocide. Unfortunately, the
killing continues, being carried out by lower members of the government
and military. This means that in order to halt the genocide we will have
to invade after all. However, notice that now we will be invading a state
without a head, without a fully functioning government, and this can make
the takeover an easier affair. Of course there will likely be guerrilla fighters
who continue on without the government’s leadership, but without a central
authority guiding them the main military force will be much easier to isolate
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and defeat. Also, as the military detachments being engaged will be smaller,
it will be possible to impress them to surrender more easily, providing a real
method for reducing casualties all around. Therefore, even if assassinating
the leader (or top levels of government) does not suffice for preventing the
need for war, it will at least make war less morally costly of an enterprise.
One might object here that if the government and military are still car-
rying out the genocidal project, then this likely indicates either that a new
leader has emerged or that there is broad support for the program. Now, if
it is the former, then the same reasoning above holds: assassinate the leader,
and if the killing continues, invade, fighting a military and government which
is slightly less well organized. If it is the latter, then the immediate killings
will still continue unabated, but the lack of central military and civil lead-
ership means that defeating the state and occupying it will be possible in a
shorter time and with less bloodshed, and this in turn will allow the occu-
pying forces to more quickly establish law and order in the state and stop
the genocide. Therefore, whether the crimes are committed directly by the
state and its leaders or by local militias and gangs, by first eliminating the
leadership, military victory and subsequent occupation will be made less
morally costly34 and more rapid, allowing for a more effective halting of the
genocide. As such, assassination can be justified on consequential grounds
both because it can prevent war or grievous rights violations, and because
it can make war a less morally costly, more effective enterprise, with fewer
casualties all around.
5 Punishment and Deterrence
So far we have seen some principled defenses of assassination, as well as an
enumeration of some of the situations where assassination would likely be able
to bring about better consequences than war or other diplomatic, economic,
and military means. In this section, we will examine a third defense of
assassination which makes use of both deontic and consequential lines of
reasoning, namely assassination as both punishment and deterrence.
One of the fatal flaws of war as a policy tool is that it so rarely causes
34By less “morally costly”, what is meant is that there will be less expenditure of morally
relevant goods. This will include most obviously lives and amount of harm or suffering, but
will also encompass things like infrastructure, economic goods, and even diplomatic and
political capital, as these can all have an impact on the lives and well-being of individuals.
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any real harm to those who foment wars or push their nations to commit
horrible crimes. This is not to say that everyday citizens do not have their
own share of the blame, but rather to point out that more often than not,
those citizens would be going about their everyday lives were it not for pro-
paganda machines, government actions, and tyrannical leaders inciting them
to violence. And in most cases, when all is said and done and the leader has
finally been driven out of power, he usually ends up whiling away the rest
of his years in some penthouse apartment overlooking the sea, protected by
a host of soldiers and guards provided by some friendly tyrant. Rarely are
there Nuremberg trials, hunts for the guilty, or punishment afterwards, with
the majority of deposed tyrants and war criminals living to ripe old ages in
the sort of luxury customary for princes and kings. For example, after being
deposed the former “president” and dictator of Uganda, Idi Amin, whose
regime was responsible for between 300,000 and 500,000 deaths, continued
living in peace and luxury, first in Libya and then Saudi Arabia, for a time
occupying the top two floors of a hotel in Jeddah and in fact being paid a
generous stipend in return for which he agreed to stay out of politics. Even-
tually he died in his late seventies from kidney failure, without once having
answered for his crimes or having paid any price for the lives he took or the
pain he caused.
Now, I assume that such a story will have filled most readers with at least
a thin stream of righteous anger at such injustice. To think that a man who
committed such evil and did so many horrifying things could not only walk
away unscathed but in fact live a long and happy life, a life full of plenty
while innocents around the world starved, is unthinkable. It is not just that
by failing to assassinate him we allowed more innocents to die. It is not just
that by waging a war to depose him innocents were killed while he walked
free.35 It is that by failing to kill him, either during or after his reign, we
showed that one can commit all manner of harmful, illegal, internationally
condemned acts and get away scot-free. We showed that crimes can go
unpunished as long as they are terrible enough. And we showed that if
someone can demonstrate just how dangerous they can be, then we might
even pay them to stop and stay at home. In short, we made tyranny and
oppression into a business, one which pays well and offers great benefits.
This is the third reason why assassination is permissible, why in some
35Amin was finally removed from power as a result of the Uganda-Tanzania War, which
caused roughly 2,000 combatant and 2,000 civilian casualties in total.
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cases it is obligatory; the guilty ought to be punished, both for the sake of
their victims and in order to deter future criminality. This claim involves two
separate arguments, that we ought to punish because of the crimes that were
committed (retrospective justification) and that we ought to punish to deter
future wrongdoing (prospective justification). Much of the former argument
has been covered in section 3 above, and for the sake of brevity I will not
rehash it all here. Let us then turn to the latter argument and examine
assassination as a deterrent.
One of the most instructive cases we could examine here is the ongoing
Syrian Civil War, which at the time of writing this is in its eighth year now
and has claimed over 400,000 lives, roughly 100,000 of whom were civilians.
In addition, it has displaced an estimated 6.6 million people internally, and
created over 5.6 million refugees.36 Obviously, as a civil war there are many
who we might hold accountable for these outcomes, many who we might
blame, but while virtually all parties to the conflict have violated human
rights and utilized tactics and armaments that are internationally banned,
the majority of crimes rest with the Syrian government and its forces.37 One
of the most widely reported and condemned actions of the Syrian government
was the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack of April 4, 2017, which killed 70-
100 civilians, injuring hundreds more.3839 In the wake of the attack U.S.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that “[i]t is clear that this is how
Bashar al-Assad operates: with brutal, unabashed barbarism”, concluding
that “[a]nyone who uses chemical weapons to attack his own people shows a
fundamental disregard for human decency and must be held accountable.”40
Three days after the Khan Shaykhun attack the U.S. attempted to follow
through with that threat and “hold al-Assad accountable”, resulting in the
launching of 59 tomahawk cruise missiles targeting the air base from which
36All documentation and estimates can be found at amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-
east-and-north-africa/syria and unhcr.org/syria-emergency. Estimates were retrieved on
June 20, 2018.
37See, e.g. www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/ for an up to date accounting of the various
crimes committed by the Syrian government. See also United Nations (2014).
38This is by no means the most significant nor most deadly attack, but it drew special
attention as it involved the intentional use of chemical weapons against civilians, violating
numerous international treaties and laws.
39Both the Syrian and Russian governments deny that chemical weapons were used in
the attack, but the UN and Human Rights Watch, as well as numerous other parties
involved in the conflict have attributed the chemical strike to Syrian government forces.
40See www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/269460.htm.
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the chemical attack was believed to have originated. The U.S. missile strike
killed 7-9 soldiers and possibly 9 civilians as well,41 but failed to significantly
impact the combat effectiveness of the Syrian air forces, or to reduce their
capability to launch more chemical weapons. More than this, even had the
attack succeeded in both of these goals, it is utterly unclear how this could
be seen as “holding al-Assad accountable”. He would still be the president
of Syria, still command a significant and powerful military in the region, still
be willing to imprison, torture, and kill civilians as well as utilize chemical
weapons against his own population. In short, he would be out one airbase,
some aircraft, and a chemical weapons stockpile, and that would be it, but
there is no indication that this would “teach him a lesson” or lead to any
different behavior on his part. The simple fact is that “[t]he warring parties
do not fear being held accountable for their acts”,42 and a limited missile
strike to an airbase will not change that.
But why do the parties have no fear of being held accountable? The
simple answer is that tribunals and punishments will likely only be handed
out after the conflict has ended, and then the victor will be the one deter-
mining who is brought to the stand. Given this, it is in each party’s interest
to do whatever is necessary to win, otherwise they will certainly be brought
to trial afterward and likely executed. Winning therefore provides a double
advantage, by allowing the victors to avoid prosecution for their own crimes
while simultaneously providing a platform for them to punish their former
adversaries and consolidate power. This perversely incentivizes the commis-
sion of any atrocity and the breaching of any law or custom if that might
improve the chances of victory. Moreover, as the U.S. “retaliation” exempli-
fies, breaches of law and treaty will almost never be met with punishment of
the actual leader of the state or those responsible for criminal behavior, but
rather with punishment of the state’s military and infrastructure, a threat
that is without any strength or deterrent force for a leader who has by his
own campaigns devastated his nation and population. And as the case of Idi
Amin above shows, it is all to easy for a tyrant, once deposed, to find sanc-
tuary and protection when the fighting stops, and never be made to answer
for the crimes that were committed. These two facts, that winning by any
cost lowers the chances of punishment, and that punishment can be avoided
41The Syrian government maintains that 7 soldiers and 9 civilians were killed, while the
U.S. claims to have killed 9 soldiers without any collateral damage to civilians.
42United Nations (2014), p. 1.
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even in the case of defeat, conspire to make leaders and opposition groups
unlikely (or at least less likely) to abide by the rules, be they moral, legal, or
otherwise, if those rules pose any disadvantage during the fighting.
Assassination as a form of punishment can remedy this in two distinct
ways. First, by putting a price on the head of a leader as soon as he or she
breaches the accepted rules of war, it becomes possible to make the costs
of “brutal, unabashed barbarism” fall on those who actually endorse and
command the use of such tactics, rather than on the soldiers and civilians
who would likely be somewhere else if given the chance. Moreover, assassi-
nation also makes clear that there will be consequences for such acts, and
consequences which cannot be pushed onto others or negotiated during some
arduous treaty process or post-conflict resolution. Instead, the use of chem-
ical weapons, the targeting of civilians, or other grave breaches of the laws
of war and humanity will be responded to in one way: painting a target on
the leader’s chest. By forsaking the rules of war and the laws of humanity,
a leader makes him- or herself an outlaw of humanity, and will be hunted
down as an outlaw and given the amount of justice that a smoking barrel
can provide.
Second, assassination is a form of punishment that can be meted out any
time so long as the leader still lives, and ought to be utilized with that in
mind. Thus, when Idi Amin fled Uganda, receiving sanctuary in Libya and
then Saudi Arabia, he ought to have been pursued to those lands. He ought
to have been hunted down and killed for his crimes.43 This may seem like
a harsh, perhaps unnecessary judgment, since he was no longer a threat to
the people of Uganda, or to any other nation for that matter. However,
by allowing him to escape into a life of luxury without demanding that he
pay any costs for his crimes, it became apparent that such crimes could be
committed with impunity. In a world where atrocities abound and tyrants
crop up in nations around the globe, such impunity cannot be allowed, for it is
the very reason why leaders like al-Assad “do not fear being held accountable
for their acts”, because as things are now, the chances are good that he
himself will never be made to suffer for those atrocities.
Thus, assassination would provide a double-deterrent for those who might
commit acts of aggression or grave human rights violations, for it would im-
43This is too quick, in that capturing and trying him is preferable to execution. However,
in the event that capture will plausibly result in the death of any other individual, friendly
or enemy, it is preferable to kill him because of his guilt.
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mediately make them, as individuals, targets of violence, rather than merely
making their militaries or states targets of violence, and it would also make
them enduring targets of violence. It may be the case that a tyrant is willing
to carry an increased risk of death in order to remain in power, but there
are few who would be willing to live under the constant and real threat of
assassination if that threat were one being made by a credible adversary. Put
differently, if the U.S. response to the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack had
been to fire 59 tomahawk cruise missiles at Bashar al-Assad’s motorcade,
killing him in punishment for that breach of international law, there are few
fighters or leaders in the Syrian Civil War who would willingly use chemi-
cal weapons in the future. And if that threat of death persisted until the
leader was finally killed, then the deterrent effect would be that much more
pronounced.
Before moving on, it may be useful to motivate these last few claims, as
I am sure there are many who will have found them excessively violent or
antagonistic. So let me paint a picture. Suppose you have woken up early
to go to work. You are walking through the still darkened streets when a
rocket strikes the ground ahead of you. You have been living for years in a
war-torn state, and know to leap backwards onto the ground and cover your
head. To your mild surprise and immediate joy the rocket seems to have been
a dud, having only resulted in a weak blast with little damage to anything
around it. Counting your blessings you continue towards work, but rapidly
find it difficult to breathe. Your heart slows as your chest tightens, and you
feel your limbs becoming cold. You panic, drawing short ragged breaths,
trying to force air into your lungs, but you are only pushing the poison
further into your system. Unable to breathe, to think, you collapse onto the
ground, small spasms contorting your body, and the last thing you see are
the contrails overhead as the bombers slip away back to their government
base.
Now suppose that it is not you on the ground dying, gasping for breath
while your life ebbs away, but rather your husband, your wife, your children
who you were taking to school. This was the situation for too many people on
the morning of April 4th, 2017, ordinary people going about their lives who
were targeted by a government and leader who would view them as, at best,
pawns on a chess board. And in reprisal for such horror, for such barbarism,
we take the lives of his soldiers while he sits in a palace sipping the finest
of wines and poring over strategy maps and diplomatic communiques. That
is simply wrong, and Rex Tillerson was right in saying that such “brutal
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unabashed barbarism... shows a fundamental disregard for human decency
and must be held accountable”. But we must always be certain that we
are holding the guilty accountable, and not their thugs or pawns, not their
soldiers who are only partially responsible or their citizens who are the real
victims anyway. Killing is a horrific act that is only justified in the gravest
of cases, and we must be certain that when we kill we are only killing those
who have committed crimes for which they must answer.
To use the words of Thomas More, moral individuals will consider assas-
sination both “wise, since it enables them to win tremendous wars without
fighting any actual battles, and also merciful and humane, since it enables
them, by the sacrifice of a few guilty men, to spare the lives of many inno-
cent persons who would have died in the fighting, some on their side, some on
the enemy’s.” More than this though, “they [the moral individuals] pity the
mass of the enemy’s soldiers almost as much as their own citizens, for they
know common people do not go to war of their own accord, but are driven
to it by the madness of princes”, and this is precisely why morality demands
that we target the leaders of a state before we begin visiting violence and
devastation on the common people who would not be at war were it not for
their leaders’ actions.44
6 Objections
Before concluding it will be useful to address a few lingering objections to
the practice of assassination. The first objection that one may still raise is
that assassination invariably involves perfidy and treachery, which is illegal
under international law45 and may harm the trust needed to end conflicts
and return parties to a state of peace thereafter.46 However, this objection is
without any real bite in the modern era. It may be true that earlier instances
of assassination necessarily, or at least often, involved close confidants betray-
ing their superiors’ trust, or relied on information provided by a disgruntled
44More (2016), p. 92.
45Article 37 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva conventions does not place an
explicit ban on assassination, but does outlaw any “resort to perfidy”, or “[a]cts inviting
the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to
accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with
intent to betray that confidence”. If assassination involves such perfidy, then it would be
illegal under international law. See Roberts and Guelff (2004), p. 442.
46Michael Gross repeatedly makes this argument in his works opposing assassination.
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populace, thereby undermining the bonds of international trust or putting
more innocents in harm’s way, but this is simply not the case in an age when
satellite communications can locate a target on the other side of the world
and precision missiles can be fired from thousands of miles away. Even more
straightforwardly, it is all too simple for any advanced nation to covertly
insert a handful of trained operatives into a state for the purpose of conduct-
ing an assassination, without once relying on informant information or the
customary rules of war to cover their actions. Returning to the example of
al-Assad discussed above, it is simply implausible to maintain that were the
U.S. cruise missiles to have been fired at the presidential motorcade instead
of an airfield, this would somehow have constituted an act of perfidy. The
United States loudly condemned al-Assad’s regime on a number of occasions,
explicitly stating that the use of chemical weapons against civilians would
not be tolerated, and following through with that threat poses no special risk
to international bonds of trust or the ability of nations to return to a state
of peace. In fact, by demonstrating that leaders who blatantly violate inter-
national laws and norms will not be allowed to do so without consequence,
those very bonds of trust that underpin organizations like the UN can be fur-
ther strengthened, in virtue of demonstrating one’s commitment to rights,
international law, and the sanctity of human life. In short, the objection
from perfidy can, at most, show that certain methods of assassination are
problematic, but not that assassination itself is.
A second objection one may raise is that assassination takes away a rather
crucial “out” for tyrants, forcing them to fight to their last breath. Put
differently, it has been common to try to induce tyrants or war criminals
to relinquish power or halt their criminal behaviors in return for amnesty
and safe passage to some friendly territory (sometimes referred to as the
“golden parachute” strategy), and assassination may undermine or eliminate
the efficacy of this option. Now, the first point worth noticing is that the
golden parachute strategy is itself flawed in serious respects. It utterly fails to
provide any form of justice for the guilty or restitution for his or her victims,
relying entirely on a rather näıve utilitarian calculation of costs and benefits.
Second, it may provide a solution in some particular cases, but as a broad
strategy it serves only to incentivize aggression and war crimes, by showing
that if one is a sufficiently dangerous and oppressive leader then one can
“get a pass” when all is said and done. Third, the golden parachute method
provides no guarantee that the leader, once gone, will not return and incite
or cause more violence in the future, and it is foolish, to say the least, to
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trust in the honor of tyrants. And even were this strategy independently
meritorious, there is no reason why assassination would directly impact it
anyway. We can fire missiles at the presidential motorcade, send in sniper
teams to shoot the dictator where he stands, or scramble fighters to down
his plane, and still offer amnesty and a pension if the tyrant is so crafty that
all of these methods somehow fail. Assassination, far from taking options
off the table, increases the number of tools and methods at our disposal for
preventing, punishing, and deterring violence and war crimes.
The final and most pressing objection one may have is that assassination
may lead to an even worse situation than the one we start with, in extreme
cases resulting in a descending circle of violence and reprisal. Thus, by remov-
ing one leader we may create a power vacuum that is filled by a worse leader
or organization (the removal of Saddam Hussein and subsequent spread of
ISIS may be seen as such a situation), or it may lead to acts of revenge by
the targeted group which is then responded to violently, resulting in further
revenge killings, and so on (Israel’s targeted killing of Palestinian militants
often led to waves of terror attacks in vengeance, demonstrating that at least
in the short run, assassination may lead to increased violence).47
Now, this objection is a serious one, and one which cannot be dealt with in
as straightforward a fashion as those above, because it will always be the case
that the killing of the leader may worsen matters rather than improve them.
However, the same is true of any enterprise, war included. We simply cannot
know with certainty that such and such a course of action will definitely
lead to this particular outcome. The best we can hope for is to limit the
probability of the conflict spreading and increase the probability of a rapid
and peaceful resolution. This, however, will never amount to a guarantee that
things will not spiral out of control, and is something we must learn to live
with if we desire to act in the international arena. Moreover, assassination
has in its favor that the initial act only involves the death of one (or at most,
a few) individuals, meaning that if it does lead to a worse situation, at least
few individuals will have been killed at the outset. War, on the other hand,
inevitably involves far more casualties, and since it also may have unintended
consequences (as the U.S. invasion of Iraq has had), this makes it a harder
act to justify. This does not mean that assassination is necessarily justified,
but it does mean that if war is justified, so is assassination, because it lowers
the number of lives we expect will be lost.
47See David (2003).
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Finally, if assassination is used in the manner which has been argued
for in this paper, as a means to punish breaches of international law and
grave violations of human rights, as well as deter future instances of these
crimes, then such degenerate situations will be extraordinarily rare, being
only possible when one faces the most radical and suicidal of leaders or
groups. The reason for this is because if the assassination of some leader is
justified, and a worse leader then emerges, then the assassination of the new
leader will by default also be justified, given that he or she is worse than the
one who was just killed. Therefore, we ought then to assassinate this new
leader, and if the replacement for this leader is even worse, then assassinate
him or her as well, and so on. At some point (I would wager after only one or
two assassinations) that newest leader taking charge will opt for a leadership
style that does not automatically make him or her a “dead (wo)man walking”,
which means that he or she will stop the criminal practices that justified
assassination in that first instance. Put shortly, by killing those who order
or allow grave breaches of international law, and stating explicitly why the
assassination took place (because the leader allowed or ordered the grave
breaching of international law), it becomes possible to reign in situations
where all sides have forsaken law and civility in conflict, and reinstate the
principles of international justice and peace that we so hope to establish
throughout the globe.
7 Conclusion
In conclusion, within the confines of standard international law and common-
sense morality, where wars can be justified and violence is not absolutely
prohibited, there is no principled objection to assassination that stands up
to scrutiny. There may be principled limitations to assassination, rules and
worries that limit when it may be used and what means may be employed,
but the practice itself cannot be unequivocally banned unless we ban all use
of force. Simply put, if soldiers may be targeted, many of whom are innocent
to one degree or another, and civilians may be killed incidentally, then there
is no reason why the leaders of a state must be off limits simply because
they are politicians. When a tyrant orders his soldiers, on threat of death,
to round up and exterminate some “undesirable” group, then that tyrant
becomes a legitimate target of violence, whether or not he wears a uniform.
And if that tyrant is certain to have committed such grave crimes then his
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life becomes forfeit, not just because of what he as an individual has done,
but in order to show that aggression and disrespect for human life and human
rights will not be tolerated, to deter future violations, and to strengthen the
norms of humanity that we, through organizations like the UN, hope to see
thrive in the world. This does not mean the leader must necessarily die, as
it is still preferable to capture and try the individual if this is possible, but
if an extraction mission will result in more deaths (soldier or civilian) than
an assassination, then we ought to spare those other lives and shoot to kill.
Assassination, as a tool of international peacekeeping and justice, is jus-
tified on both deontic and consequential grounds, in that it provides one of
the only methods for punishing the guilty and protecting the innocent which
does not simultaneously put other, perhaps more innocents in harm’s way
(as war, sanctions, and embargoes do), and because it provides a method
which may be able to prevent the need for war or at least make war a less
morally costly enterprise. Importantly though, assassination is only morally
acceptable so long as it is used to uphold international law and norms (i.e. it
only targets those guilty of waging aggressive war or committing grave vio-
lations of human rights), and cannot be used simply as a general policy tool
or method for eliminating political opponents. Thus, ideological, religious,
or political disagreements do not justify the assassination of leaders, but war
crimes, aggressive military adventures, and crimes against humanity do. If
a norm of assassination were adopted, limited in its use to only those cases
where an individual’s actions are clearly “beyond the pale”, this would go a
long way to strengthening international law by forcefully demonstrating that
offenders will pay the dearest of costs, and making certain that no criminal
or would-be tyrant may escape justice. Though there is still much work to
be done concerning assassination, including a great deal of empirical research
and exploration, it is my hope that the arguments presented here will help
to lift the stigma associated with the practice.
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